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We consider a recently proposed entity authentication protocol, in which a physical unclonable
key is interrogated by random coherent states of light, and the quadratures of the scattered light
are analysed by means of a coarse-grained homodyne detection. We derive a sufficient condition for
the protocol to be secure against an emulation attack, in which an adversary knows the challenge-
response properties of the key, and moreover he can access the challenges during the verification.
The security analysis relies on Holevo’s bound and Fano’s inequality, and suggests that the protocol
is secure against the emulation attack for a broad range of physical parameters that are within reach
of today’s technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.-p
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of entity authentication (identifica-
tion) protocols (EAPs), which are robust against cloning
and other impersonation strategies, is an outstanding
task in modern cryptography [1, 2]. Currently, optical
physical unclonable keys (PUKs) are considered to be
the most promising candidates for the development of
highly robust EAPs [3–11]. Typically, optical PUKs are
materialized by multiple-scattering optical media, where
disorder is introduced during fabrication. Hence, faithful
cloning of an optical PUK requires the exact position-
ing (on a nanometer scale) of millions of scatterers with
the exact size and shape, which is considered to be a
formidable challenge not only for current, but for future
technologies as well [5, 6, 9].
Optical PUK-based authentication protocols [3–11]
rely on two-stage challenge-response mechanisms, analo-
gous to the ones used in everyday transactions with smart
cards (e.g., credit cards), at automatic teller machines,
and point of sale terminals [1, 2]. The enrolment stage is
performed only once by the manufacturer (or the author-
ity that issues and distributes the PUKs), well before the
PUK is given to a user. It aims at the faithful character-
ization of the PUK with respect to its optical responses
to a finite set of random challenges, that is to light pulses
(probes) with random parameters. The set of challenge-
response pairs (CRPs) is stored at a server, and the PUK
is given to a user, together with a personal identification
number (PIN), which is also saved at the same server.
The verification stage takes place each time the holder of
the PUK has to be authenticated to the system, it is per-
formed by a legitimate verifier, who is connected to the
server over a secure and authenticated classical channel,
and involves two steps. First, the user inserts his PUK in
a verification device and types in his secret PIN. In this
way the user is verified to the PUK, thereby preventing
∗ nikolg@iesl.forth.gr
someone who has stolen the PUK and does not know the
PIN, to pass himself as the user. The PIN is sent to
the server over the classical channel, and if it is valid the
verifier has to decide whether the PUK is authentic or
not. To this end, the server sends to the verifier (over
the classical channel), a moderate number of challenges,
chosen at random from the recorded challenges in the
database. The verifier interrogates sequentially the PUK
with each one of the challenges, and the corresponding
responses are sent back to the server, where they are
compared to those in the database. The server decides
upon the acceptance (rejection) of the PUK, based on
some algorithm that takes into account the deviations
from the expected responses. The number of challenges
that are used in the verification stage depends on the
EAP under consideration, but in any case it should be
such that the verification stage takes place within a rea-
sonable amount of time, say few seconds (see also related
discussion in Sec. II B).
Most of the proposed optical EAPs that rely on PUKs,
exploit the speckle of the scattered light and pertain to
classical challenges [3–8]. If the verification set-up is not
tamper-resistant, such EAPs are vulnerable to emula-
tion attacks, in which the adversary has stolen the PIN
and knows the challenge-response properties of the PUK.
Hence, his task is to intercept each challenge during the
verification stage, measure it, and send to the verifier the
expected response [9]. This is a highly realistic scenario
[12], and if the adversary can access the classical chal-
lenges during the verification, nothing prevents him from
determining them completely, without introducing any
errors.
The robustness of PUK-based optical EAPs against
emulation attacks can be increased considerably if the
PUK is challenged by quantum states of light. When the
quantum state is chosen at random from a set of non-
orthogonal states, the laws of quantum physics prevent
an adversary to discriminate unambiguously between dif-
ferent states, while information gain can be obtained at
the cost of disturbing the state of the probe [13]. Hence,
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2FIG. 1. (Color online) A schematic representation of the PUK-based optical EAP under consideration.
if the EAP is designed judiciously so that the response
of the PUK depends on the quantum state of the probe,
then it is highly unlikely for an adversary to estimate cor-
rectly all of the challenges used during the verification of
a PUK without introducing any errors. In this spirit,
Goorden et al have proposed and implemented an au-
thentication protocol, in which the challenges pertain to
attenuated laser pulses with shaped wavefronts [9]. The
mean number of photons per mode in the challenge is less
than 1, which prevents an adversary from characterizing
fully the wavefront of the challenge.
Recently, we proposed an alternative PUK-based opti-
cal EAP, which relies on standard wavefront-shaping and
homodyne-detection techniques [11]. In the framework of
a tamper-resistant verification set-up, it was shown that
the protocol offers collision resistance, and it is robust
against PUK cloning. The present work focuses on the
verification stage of the protocol, and in particular on the
authentication of the PUK to the system. Our main task
is to investigate the robustness of the protocol against an
emulation attack, in which a cheater has obtained access
to the database without being noticed [12], and moreover
he has been able to bypass the actual verification set-up,
thereby directing each probe to his detection device for
analysis.
II. AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
The verification set-up has been discussed in detail
elsewhere [11], and for the sake of completeness, its main
components are outlined in Fig. 1. It consists of three
major parts namely, the laser source, the interrogation
chamber, and the homodyne-detection chamber. Light
from the laser source is split into two parts: a weak probe
that is directed to the interrogation chamber by means
of a single-mode fiber (SMF), and a strong local oscilla-
tor (LO), which serves as a reference in the homodyne
detection (HD). The interrogation chamber is basically
a standard wavefront-shaping set-up, in which the light
from SMF A is collimated, and its spatial phase pat-
tern is modulated by means of a phase-only spatial light-
modulator (SLM) [14–23]. The shaped wavefront is then
focused on the PUK, and the phase mask of the SLM is
optimized so that the multiple-scattered light is mainly
directed to a prescribed transversal spatial mode of the
output plane (target mode), where it is coupled to SMF
B [14–23]. The collected scattered light is transferred to
the HD set-up, where its quadratures are analysed.
Standard wavefront shaping set-ups allow for the con-
trol of hundreds and even thousands of spatial modes,
and the intensity of the scattered light is enhanced rela-
tive to the unoptimized case by a factor E  1. Due to
noise and imperfections, the enhancement factor that can
be achieved in practise is below the ideally expected value
of piN/4 ' 0.78N [15, 20, 24, 25], where N is the number
of modes that can be controlled in the wavefront-shaping
set-up. The reported ratios E/N in related experiments
range from about 0.2 to about 0.6 [24].
A. Challenge-response pairs
The enrolment of a PUK takes place only once, and
aims at the generation of a finite set of CRPs, which
is stored in a server, and will be used for the authenti-
cation of the PUK. The enrolment is performed by the
manufacturer well before the PUK is given to a user,
and we naturally assume that the enroller has all the
time and the resources needed so that the accuracy in
the estimation of the response of the PUK to each one
of the challenges, is considerably higher than the accu-
racy in the verification stage [11]. Throughout this work
we consider identical set-ups for the enrolment and the
verification stages, which operate in the diffusive limit
[26, 31], and all of their specifications (i.e., transmission
losses, imperfections, etc) are publicly known.
Our scheme accepts various types of challenges, per-
taining to the probe state, the target mode and the phase
mask of the SLM. In this work, we consider a rather sim-
ple challenge, by assuming that the target mode (i.e., the
position of SMF B at the output plane) is fixed and pub-
licly known. Hence, a challenge has two parts and it is
of the form
Ck = {k,Φ(K) : k ∈ ZN} , (1)
with the integer k chosen at random from a uniform dis-
tribution over ZN ≡ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N−1}, while the integer
N  1 is a publicly known constant. We consider coher-
ent probe states with the same, publicly known mean
3number of photons µP , and random phase ϕk i.e.,
|αk〉 := |√µP eiϕk〉, with ϕk := 2pik
N
. (2)
Hence, the integer k identifies uniquely the probe state.
Finally, Φ denotes the optimal phase-mask for the SLM,
which maximizes the intensity of the scattered light in
SMF B, and depends on the scattering matrix of the
PUK K, as well as various parameters of the fixed set-
up, which are assumed to be publicly known and are not
shown in Eq. (1). It is worth emphasizing here that for
the optimization process used in our simulations [11], the
optimal phase mask of the SLM does not depend on the
phase of the probe [27]. In fact, it has been demonstrated
both theoretically and experimentally that an optimal
phase mask works equally well, regardless the quantum
state of the incoming light [21–23].
The response of the PUK to a given challenge Ck, per-
tains to the electric field Eˆk(K) := Xˆk(K) + iYˆk(K) in
SMF B (see table I). For later convenience, let us intro-
duce here the generalized θ−quadrature Qˆk(θ) of the field
in SMF B, with Qˆk(0) = Xˆk and Qˆk(pi/2) = Yˆk. It has
been shown that in the diffusive limit, the field in SMF
B is also in a coherent state, say |βk〉, with the expecta-
tion value of θ−quadrature given by (see also appendix
A) [11]
〈Qˆk(θ)〉 :=
√
2µR cos(ψk − θ), (3a)
with
µR = E|F|2µP , (3b)
ψk := arg(F) + ϕk. (3c)
The factor F is a complex number that depends on
the PUK K, the phase-mask of the SLM and various
other publicly-known parameters of the set-up, while
|F|2 < 1/N [11]. As mentioned above, the enhancement
factor E depends on the details of set-up, and in prac-
tise it does not exceed the ideal value of piN/4. Hence,
we expect µR < piµP /4 ≈ 0.78µP . For a fixed verifica-
tion set-up and a given PUK, arg(F) is a global phase,
which shifts the phase of the probe ϕk, and thus it is not
expected to affect the following security analysis (see re-
lated discussion in Sec. III C). In the attack to be consid-
ered below, the adversary is assumed to know the CRPs
for the PUK [12], while F is publicly known.
For a fixed set-up and given PUK, a CRP is uniquely
identified by the choice of the probe i.e., by the choice
of the integer k ∈ ZN , because throughout this work,
all of the parameters of the set-up, including µP and the
position of SMF B, are assumed to be publicly known. As
will be explained below, even if an adversary has obtained
access to the server where the database of CRPs is stored,
the response of the PUK to a randomly chosen probe
state |αk〉 cannot be estimated without knowledge of the
integer k.
To suppress notation, the dependence of Φ and Eˆk
on the PUK K, is not explicitly shown in the following
TABLE I. Illustration of a set of CRPs used for authentication
of a PUK. The angles θ = 0 and pi/2 refer to the quadratures
Xˆk and Yˆk of the response field Eˆk, respectively.
PIN
Challenge Response
k Phase mask θ = 0 θ = pi/2
0 〈Xˆ0〉 〈Yˆ0〉
1 〈Xˆ1〉 〈Yˆ1〉
2 Φ 〈Xˆ2〉 〈Yˆ2〉
...
...
...
N − 1 〈XˆN−1〉 〈YˆN−1〉
sections. In the emulation attack under consideration the
attacker bypasses the interrogation chamber, and thus
the PUK does not enter the related security analysis.
Before we proceed with the attack, however, it will be
helpful to discuss briefly the verification of a PUK, in
the ideal scenario of tamper-resistant verification set-up
and secure server.
B. Verification in the absence of cheating
By contrast to the enrolment stage, verification takes
place each time a PUK has to be authenticated by a le-
gitimate verifier, who has access to the server (where the
database of CRPs is located) over a secure and authen-
ticated classical channel. The first action of the verifier
is to send the user’s PIN to the server, over the classical
channel. If the PIN is not valid the verification is aborted.
Otherwise, the server returns a number of challenges, say
{C1, C2, . . . , CM} [see Eq. (1)], chosen at random and
independently from the registered finite set of CRPs for
the PUK to be authenticated. In addition, the server
sends to the verifier a sequence of random and indepen-
dently chosen angles {θ1, θ2, . . . , θM}, with θj uniformly
distributed over {0, pi/2} [28, 29].
The verifier queries the PUK with each one of the M
challenges sequentially, and records the corresponding re-
sponses. Given that the challenges are chosen at ran-
dom and independently, it is sufficient to consider one
of the challenges, say the jth one. The phase mask of
the SLM is set to Φ, and the phase of the probe is set
to ϕkj = 2pikj/N . The verifier measures the quadrature
amplitude of the electric field of the scattered light in
SMF B, by means of HD where the LO serves as the re-
quired reference [32]. More precisely, for the jth query,
the LO phase is set to θj ∈ {0, pi/2}, and the verifier
measures the quadrature Qˆkj (θj). Assuming that the LO
field is much stronger than the total scattered field, the
outcome of such a measurement is a real random number
qj which, to a good accuracy, follows a normal (Gaus-
sian) distribution N (q¯kj (θj), σ
2), with standard devia-
tion σ ' 1/√2η, where η ≤ 1 is the detection efficiency
[33]. In other words, the measurement of the quadrature
4Qˆkj (θj) is equivalent to sampling from the Gaussian dis-
tributionN (q¯kj (θj), σ
2). The mean q¯kj (θj) also depends
on the scattering matrix of the PUK, but for the reasons
discussed above, this dependence is not explicitly shown.
The sequence of random outcomes {q1, q2, . . . , qM}, are
sent to the server over the secure and authenticated clas-
sical channel.
Aiming at practical verification tests, and in order to
circumvent difficulties arising from statistical deviations
in finite sampling, we proposed a verification process that
employs two-bin coarse-graining of the outcomes from the
M independent HDs. More precisely, in the jth sample
with challenge Cj and measured quadrature Qˆkj (θj), the
server checks if the outcome qj falls in the interval (bin)
Bkj (θj) =
[
〈Qˆkj (θj)〉 −
∆
2
, 〈Qˆkj (θj)〉+
∆
2
]
, (4)
which is centred at the expected response recorded in the
database of CRPs, and has size 2σ . ∆ < 4σ.
In the ideal scenario, where the true PUK is authen-
ticated in a tamper-resistant verification set-up and no
cheating takes place, the verifier samples from a Gaus-
sian distribution centred at q¯kj (θ) = 〈Qˆkj (θj)〉, which
coincides with center of the bin Bkj (θj). Hence, the
probability for the outcome qkj to fall in the bin, given
that the PUK is interrogated by challenge Cj and the
θj−quadrature is measured, is given by (see appendix B)
P (0)(in|kj , θj) = Erf
(
∆¯
2
√
2
)
. (5)
The key point is that this probability is independent of
kj and θj , and depends only on the ratio ∆¯ := ∆/σ.
Counting the total number of queries (samples) Min
that resulted in an outcome within the expected bin,
irrespective of the chosen challenge or the measured
quadrature, the server obtains the relative frequency
fin := Min/M , which is an estimate of the average prob-
ability
P
(0)
in :=
N−1∑
k=0
∑
θ∈{0,pi/2}
p(k)p(θ)P (0)(in|k, θ)
=
1
2N
N−1∑
k=0
∑
θ∈{0,pi/2}
P (0)(in|k, θ). (6)
Here, we have taken into account that k and θ are chosen
at random and independently from uniform distributions
over ZN and {0, pi/2}, respectively. Substituting Eq. (5)
in Eq. (6), one readily obtains
P
(0)
in = Erf
(
∆¯
2
√
2
)
. (7)
The acceptance or rejection of the PUK is decided
upon the deviation of the estimated probability fin from
the theoretically expected one, which in the absence of
any cheating is given by P
(0)
in . It has been shown that a
sample of size at least as large as
Mth :=
3 ln(2ζ−1)
ε2
, (8)
suffices for the estimate fin to satisfy
Pr(|fin − P (0)in | ≥ ε) < ζ, (9)
where ζ  1 is the uncertainty, and ε  P (0)in is the
absolute error [11]. For M > Mth one can be 100(1 −
ζ)% confident that in the absence of any cheating, the
estimate will lie within an interval of size 2ε around the
theoretically expected probability i.e., |fin − P (0)in | < ε.
So, a PUK is accepted if |fin − P (0)in | < ε, and is rejected
otherwise.
According to Eq. (8), samples of size M ' 2.3 × 107
suffice for verification tests of error ε ' 10−3 and con-
fidence 99.9%. Assuming that the separation distances
between the different components of the verification set-
up are of the order of meters or tens meters, and for HD
bandwidth ∼ 10 − 100 MHz (depending on the imple-
mentation), the total verification time is expected to be
a few seconds [11].
The interested reader may refer to Ref. [11], for a
detailed discussion on the different stages of the pro-
tocol, a full description of its implementation, as well
as for a thorough analysis on its security in the case
of tamper-resistant verification set-up and secure server.
Both of these assumptions are relaxed in the emulation
attack discussed in the following section. In this case,
the cheater’s intervention is expected to introduce errors
in the responses of the PUK to the various challenges,
thereby enforcing the verifier to sample from photocount
distributions, which are shifted relative to the expected
bins. The protocol is secure only if the aforementioned
coarse-grained HD can detect these shifts, which is not
true for any combination of µP and N . For the sake of
convenience, the main parameters entering the following
security analysis are summarized in table II.
III. EMULATION ATTACK AND SECURITY
Consider the cheating strategy of Fig. 2, in which the
adversary aims at the impersonation of the legitimate
user, without having the true PUK. The adversary does
not have access either to the laser source or to the HD
set-up of the verifier, but he has hacked the server, and
has obtained the PIN of the user he intends to imper-
sonate, together with a copy of the CRPs of his PUK
[12]. Moreover, he has installed his own perfect line,
thereby bypassing the verification set-up, and directing
each probe to his lab. Clearly, there is no need for the
adversary to have the user’s PUK, because he has a copy
of the corresponding list of CRPs [34]. If the cheater
can estimate reliably the probe state, he can prepare the
right response by looking up the set of all possible CRPs,
5FIG. 2. (Color online) A schematic representation of the emulation attack considered throughout this work. An adversary who
knows the set of all possible CRPs pertinent to a PUK, but he does not possess the actual PUK, bypasses the interrogation
chamber, thereby directing each probe in his ideal lab [34]. The probe is measured, and a response state, which is consistent
with the outcome of the measurement and the list of possible CRPs, is sent to the HD set-up of the verifier (not shown here).
TABLE II. List of the main parameters in the present security
analysis. The PIN as well as the scattering matrix of the
PUK and/or the challenge-response pairs are assumed to have
leaked to the adversary (see Sec. I and remark [12]).
Parameter Symbol Property
Mean number of photons in probe µP Public
Phase of probe ϕk Private
Total number of phases N Public
Mean number of photons in response µR Public
PIN - Leaked
Position of SMF B - Public
PUK K Private
Scattering matrix of PUK - Leaked
Number of controlled modes N Public
Phase mask of SLM Φ Leaked
Enhancement factor E Public
Detection efficiency η Public
- F Public
Other specifications of set-up - Public
Bin size ∆ Public
Error in verification tests ε Public
Confidence in verification tests ζ Public
Challenge-response pairs CRPs Leaked
and send to the HD set-up of the verifier a quantum state
that is consistent with the expected response of the true
PUK. This is possible for classical challenges, because
nothing prevents the cheater from estimating precisely
all of the characteristics of the probe, without introduc-
ing any errors. Hence, any EAP where the PUK is chal-
lenged by classical signals [4–8] is susceptible to such an
emulation attack. The situation is fundamentally dif-
ferent in our protocol, because the PUK is interrogated
by random non-orthogonal quantum states. According
to quantum mechanics, non-orthogonal quantum states
cannot be reliably distinguished [13], and thus the ad-
versary’s intervention is expected to introduce errors in
the coarse-grained HD.
A. Error probability
In our scheme, the probe state is a pure coherent state
|αk〉, with random phase. From the adversary’s point
of view, before any measurements, the probe’s state is a
mixture of the form
ρ =
1
N
N∑
k=0
|αk〉〈αk|. (10)
The average information that an adversary can ex-
tract from the state (10) is limited by the Holevo bound
χ, which is given by the von Neumann entropy S(ρ) ≡
Tr[ρ log2(ρ)] i.e.,
χ = S(ρ). (11)
For given µP and N , the entropy S(ρ) can be calculated
numerically. A simple analytic expression can be ob-
tained in the continuous limit N → ∞, where S(ρ) ap-
proximates the entropy of the Poisson distribution, which
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Two neighbouring coherent states in phase-space representation (blue and red disks), with the same
mean number of photons µ = 600, and phases that differ by 2pi/N , for three different values of N . The radius of the disks is
equal to the shot noise i.e., 1/
√
2. The Gaussians show the corresponding photocount distributions for each quadrature, and
their standard deviation is σ = 1/
√
2η, for η = 0.5. The dashed box represents an interval of size ∆ = 2σ.
for for µP & 10 is given by
H∞(µP ) ' log2(
√
2pieµP ). (12)
The overlap of neighbouring probe states is determined
by the number of different phases N , and the mean num-
ber of photons µP . The larger N becomes for a given
µP , the larger the overlap becomes (see Fig. 3).
Our scheme involves M  1 equivalent samples
(queries), and for each one of them the positive inte-
ger k is chosen at random and independently from ZN .
In the emulation attack under consideration, the ad-
versary has a copy of all the relevant CRPs. Hence,
for each one of the samples, he intercepts the probe
state and measures it, so that to obtain an estimate of
the integer k, say k˜. By looking up the set of CRPs,
he finds the expected response {〈Xˆk˜〉, 〈Yˆk˜〉} that corre-
sponds to k˜. Subsequently, he prepares and sends to the
HD (through SMF B ) the coherent state |βk˜〉 which sat-
isfies 〈βk˜|Eˆ|βk˜〉 = 〈Xˆk˜〉+ i〈Yˆk˜〉.
It may happen that in a single sample the adversary
will obtain the right value of k. In this case, the cen-
tres of the Gaussian photocount distributions for the two
quadratures coincide with the centres of the correspond-
ing bins i.e., 〈Xˆk〉 and 〈Yˆk〉. However, if µP and N are
such that there is significant overlap between different
possible probe states, it is impossible for the adversary
to distinguish them reliably, and thus to obtain the right
value of k in all of the M queries. In other words, it is
inevitable for the adversary to make wrong guesses about
the state of the probe in some queries, and thus send to
the HD set-up a response state |βk˜〉 for which the cen-
tres of the photocount distributions are shifted relative
to the expected bins i.e., 〈Xˆk˜〉 6= 〈Xˆk〉 and 〈Yˆk˜〉 6= 〈Xˆk〉.
In these cases, the probability for the outcome of the HD
to fall in the bin is smaller than the probability of Eq.
(5).
It is sufficient for our purposes to consider the prob-
ability perr for the adversary to infer a wrong value of
k, based on the outcome of his measurement on probe
state |αk〉, and perhaps some additional post processing.
According to Fano’s inequality, when k is uniformly dis-
tributed on ZN the probability of error satisfies [13]
H (perr) + perr log2(N − 1) ≥ log2(N)− χ, (13)
with the Holevo bound given by Eq. (11). Solving this
inequality for a given state ρ, one obtains a lower bound
on the error probability, say p
(low)
err .
B. Security condition
As discussed in Sec. II B, in the EAP under considera-
tion acceptance or rejection of a PUK is decided upon the
estimated average probability for an outcome to fall in a
bin. Given that the cheater’s intervention will inevitably
introduce errors, we need to find how these errors affect
the estimated probability in the verification stage.
Consider a single query, where the verifier sends |αk〉,
the cheater infers k˜ and sends the coherent state |βk˜〉
to the HD set-up of the verifier. As discussed above,
the wrong guess of the cheater will enforce the verifier
to sample from a Gaussian photocount distribution that
is shifted relative to the expected bin. More precisely,
the conditional probability for the outcome of the HD to
fall in the expected bin Bk(θ), given that the verifier has
chosen k, the adversary has inferred k˜, and the verifier
measures the θ quadrature of the field is given by (see
7appendix B)
P (in|k, k˜, θ) = 1
2
{
Erf
[
2S(k, k˜, θ) + ∆
2
√
2σ
]
− Erf
[
2S(k, k˜, θ)−∆
2
√
2σ
]}
, (14)
where
S(k, k˜, θ) := 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 − 〈Qˆk(θ)〉, (15)
and 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 is also given by Eq. (3), for index k˜ instead of
k. Recall here that 〈Qˆk(θ)〉 is the centre of the bin when
the probe state |αk〉 has been used and the θ−quadrature
is measured (see Eq. 4). When the adversary infers the
correct value of k i.e., for k˜ = k, then 〈Qˆk(θ)〉 coincides
with the mean of the Gaussian photocount distribution
the verifier samples from. When the adversary fails to
infer the correct value of k, i.e., for k˜ 6= k, the photocount
distribution is centred at Qˆk˜(θ). Hence, S(k, k˜, θ) is the
shift of the photocount distribution relative to the bin,
which is zero only in the case of k˜ = k, and non-zero
otherwise. In the former case, Eq. (14) reduces to Eq.
(5), which shows that the cheater’s intervention has not
affected the photocount statistics expected by the server
in the absence of cheating.
Given that the server asks the verifier to sample from
both quadratures at random and independently, after M
queries the verifier will obtain an estimate of the average
probability
Pin =
N−1∑
k=0
N−1∑
k˜=0
∑
θ
P (in, k, k˜, θ). (16)
The arguments of Sec. II B are also valid in the case
of cheating. That is, as long as M > Mth and ε 
Pin, with high probability the estimate of the server will
lie within an interval of size 2ε around the theoretically
expected probability, which in the presence of cheating is
Pin instead of P
(0)
in i.e., we have
|fin − Pin| < ε, (17)
with high probability.
The probability Pin is different from the corresponding
probability in the absence of cheating P
(0)
in , and can be
bounded from above as follows (see appendix C)
Pin ≤ (1− perr)P (0)in + perr max
k,k˜
{P (in|k, k˜)}k 6=k˜, (18)
where P
(0)
in is given by Eq. (7) and
P (in|k, k˜) :=
∑
θ∈{0,pi/2}
p(θ)P (in|k, k˜, θ).
Recalling that both quadratures are equally probable,
and using Eqs. (14), (15) we have
P (in|k, k˜)} = 1
4
∑
θ∈{0,pi/2}
{
Erf
[
2(〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 − 〈Qˆk(θ)〉) + ∆
2
√
2σ
]
− Erf
[
2(〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 − 〈Qˆk(θ)〉)−∆
2
√
2σ
]}
. (19)
where 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 and 〈Qˆk(θ)〉 are given by Eq. (3) for k˜ and
k, respectively. Moreover, using Eqs. (7) and (14), one
can readily confirm that maxk,k˜{P (in|k, k˜)}k 6=k˜ ≤ P (0)in ,
and thus
P
(0)
in − Pin ≥ perr
(
P
(0)
in −max
k,k˜
{P (in|k, k˜)}k 6=k˜
)
≥ 0,
(20)
where equality holds only in the absence of cheating.
As described in Sec. II B, a PUK is accepted only if
the estimate fin lies within an interval of size 2ε  1
around P
(0)
in , and not around Pin. So, the cheating will
be detected if
P
(0)
in − Pin > 2ε. (21)
Indeed, in view of inequality (17), inequality (21) im-
plies P
(0)
in − fin > ε, with high probability. That is, the
detected deviations from P
(0)
in exceed the statistical devi-
ations, and can be attributed only to some sort of cheat-
ing. Of course, one cannot infer the precise type of the
cheating, but this is not of importance for the security of
the protocol.
From inequalities (20) and (21), we obtain that the
condition
p(low)err
(
P
(0)
in −max
k,k˜
{P (in|k, k˜)}k 6=k˜
)
> 2ε, (22)
suffices to ensure the security of the protocol, where p
(low)
err
is a lower bound on the error probability perr obtained
through inequality (13).
Condition (22) is the main result of this work. The
left-hand side (l.h.s) of the inequality is a function of µP ,
N , µR, η, ∆¯, and for later convenience it will be denoted
by D. For a fixed verification set-up, with known param-
eters, condition (22) allows one to estimate combinations
of µP , N and ε, so that the protocol is secure against the
emulation attack under consideration, in the sense that
8the cheating will be detected, and the adversary will fail
to pass himself as the legitimate user.
C. Numerical results
We performed simulations for various combinations of
the parameters that enter inequality (22). More precisely,
for a given pair of {µP , N}, we calculated the entropy of
the density matrix (10), which is equal to the Holevo
bound (11). The estimated bound was used in inequality
(13) to obtain the lower bound p
(low)
err on the error prob-
ability. The difference of probabilities in inequality (22)
was estimated numerically through Eqs. (7), (19), and
(3), for various combinations of µR, ∆¯ and η.
The difference 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 − 〈Qˆk(θ)〉 enters the inequality
(22) through Eq. (19), and together with p
(low)
err , they
determine the security of the protocol for a given ε. Ac-
cording to Eq. (3), 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 and 〈Qˆk(θ)〉 have a common
amplitude
√
2µR given by (3b), and different phases given
by Eq. (3c) for k and k˜, respectively. Throughout this
analysis we assume that the adversary aims at emulating
the verification of the fixed PUK on a fixed set-up, us-
ing his knowledge on the corresponding CRPs [12]. The
mean number of scattered photons µR that are expected
at the verifier’s HD set-up, is known to the adversary.
Moreover, the adversary knows arg(F), which is a com-
mon fixed phase for both 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 and 〈Qˆk(θ)〉, because
it depends only on the set-up and the scattering matrix
of the PUK which are assumed to be fixed [11]. Thus,
arg(F ) is not expected to play any role in the inequality
(22), which has been confirmed by our simulations, and
the following results and conclusions hold for any value
of arg(F).
Our main findings are presented in Figs. 4 and 5.
For all of the combinations of parameters, D exhibits
an asymmetric bell-like behavior as a function of N . In
particular, there is a critical value of N , say Nc, which
depends strongly on µR, and weakly on η and on ∆¯. For
N < Nc, D increases with increasing N , while it de-
creases for N > Nc. This behaviour can be explained
by means of Fig. 3, and noting that D is a product of
two terms. For small values of N we have D ' 0, be-
cause there is practically no overlap between the possible
probe states, and the cheater can discriminate between
them (i.e., p
(low)
err ' 0). If we keep increasing N for fixed
µP , the probe states are coming closer and they start
overlap. Hence, p
(low)
err becomes non-zero, and increases
as we increase N . At the same time, however, the differ-
ence of the probabilities on the l.h.s. of (22) decreases,
because for any of the quadratures, the photocount dis-
tributions associated with neighbouring probes are com-
ing closer. Hence, the origin of an outcome that falls in
the expected bin becomes less certain (i.e., the sample
may have been obtained from the expected distribution,
or from one of its neighbouring distributions). In other
words, the server’s ability to discriminate between dif-
ferent distributions by looking only at the binned data
is gradually lost as we increase N . Given that D is a
product of two functions with opposite monotonicity, we
have the bell-like behaviour depicted in Figs. 4 and 5.
For typical HD set-ups η ' 0.65, but for the sake of
generality we have performed simulations for various val-
ues of η, with 0.5 ≤ η < 1. Moreover, we consider
4 ≤ N ≤ 103, which is within reach of the currently avail-
able phase modulators (typical precision 0.3-3 mrads).
As depicted in Fig. 4(a)-(b), for fixed ε, the range of
values of N for which D exceeds 2ε becomes narrower as
we decrease η, while the maximum value Dmax also de-
creases. However, in practise the detection efficiency is
limited by the available technology. Hence, it is sufficient
for our purposes to consider the worst-case scenario for
the detection efficiency η, which in our case is η = 0.5.
On the contrary, ∆¯ can be chosen as large as possible
relative to σ, because it pertains to classical processing
of data i.e., the binning of the outcomes from the HDs
in M sessions. Following the same reasoning as in the
case of η, the optimal value of ∆¯ is the one for which
the curve D(N) is as broad and as high as possible. Our
simulations suggest that the optimal value is ∆¯opt ' 2
[see Figs. 4(c)-(d)].
Let us consider now the dependence of D on µR and
N . In view of the findings above, in Fig. 5 we plot D
as a function of N and µR, for η = 0.5 and ∆¯ = 2, and
different values of µP . For the reasons explained in Sec.
II A, we have focused on µR ≤ 0.7µP . For a given value
of the error ε, each contour refers to combinations of N
and µR/µP for which D = 2ε, and the security condition
(22) is satisfied in the enclosed area. For a fixed µP ,
the range of values for N and µR for which the security
condition is satisfied, becomes broader for decreasing ε
(e.g., compare the enclosed areas for different contours in
the same plot). The same holds for fixed ε and increasing
µP (e.g., compare the enclosed areas for the same contour
in different plots).
Of course, for practical reasons, one cannot consider
arbitrarily small values of ε, because according to (8) the
required sample size increases as ∼ ε−2. As discussed
in Ref. [11], verification tests of error 5 × 10−4 . ε .
1 × 10−3 and confidence 99.9% are within reach of to-
day’s technology, and ensure security of the protocol in a
tamper-resistant scenario. Hence, the contours for 10−3
and 2× 10−3, are of particular interest, in the sense that
they are associated with sample sizes for which the proto-
col is both practical and cloning-resistant. In both cases,
we find that the enclosed (secure) areas are rather broad,
which suggests that in practise one has a lot of freedom
in choosing N and µP , so that the protocol is secure, in
spite of the details of the implementation, provided that
µR & 0.1µP .
In closing, it is worth emphasizing that in the absence
of related implementations, our simulations have covered
a broad range of ratios µR/µP . In practice, this ratio is
expected to be fixed by the verification set-up, and it can
be estimated easily by means of related measurements.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) (a,b) The l.h.s of inequality (22) is plotted as a function of the number of phases N , for various values
of η and two different values of ∆¯. The horizontal blue and red dashed lines correspond to the right-hand side of (22) for
ε = 5 × 10−4 and ε = 10−3, respectively. The protocol is secure for values N , for which D exceeds 2ε. (c,d) Same as in
plots (a,b), but for various values of ∆¯, and fixed η = 0.5. Other parameters: (a,c) µP = 600, µR = 0.2µP ; (b,d) µP = 800,
µR = 0.3µP .
Hence, using condition (22), one can estimate combina-
tions of µP , N and ε, such that the protocol is secure
against the emulation attack under consideration.
IV. DISCUSSION
Emulation attack is a very general and powerful at-
tack against EAPs that rely on challenge-response mech-
anisms, and aims at the impersonation of a legitimate
user. Generally speaking, the details of the emulation
attack depend strongly on the EAP to be attacked, but
the framework is always the same. That is, the verifi-
cation set-up is not tamper-resistant, and the adversary
knows the PIN, and the challenge-response properties of
the user’s key (conventional chip-based smart card or
PUK) [35]. Hence, the adversary’s task is to intercept
each challenge during the verification stage, read it, and
send to the verifier the expected response. Perhaps the
most important feature of the emulation attack is that
it can be adapted to any EAP, classical or quantum. E
APs that are used for everyday transactions at automatic
teller machines, as well as all of the EAPs that rely on
classical read-out of optical [3–8] or electronic PUKs [36],
are susceptible to an emulation attack.
In this work we have we have analysed the security
of the EAP of Ref. [11] against an emulation attack,
under the assumption of identical enrolment and verifica-
tion set-ups. The adversary knows the challenge-response
properties of the user’s PUK and the related PIN, but he
does not have access to the laser source, to the detection
set-up of the verifier, and to the random choice of the
challenges during the verification. Hence, the most likely
attack that he can launch is the emulation attack. More
precisely, his task is to intercept each quantum challenge
during the verification stage, measure it, and send to
the verifier’s detection set-up the corresponding response.
Our analysis is rather general and does not involve any
assumptions about the type of the measurement. Using
Holevo’s bound and Fano’s inequality, we derived a suf-
ficient condition for an implementation of the protocol
to be secure against the emulation attack. The present
results suggest that the protocol of Ref. [11] can be prac-
tical, and simultaneously secure against cloning and em-
ulation attack.
For the time being it is not known whether the em-
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The l.h.s of the security condition
(22) is plotted as a function of N and the ratio µR/µP , for
µP = 400 (a), 600 (b) and 1000 (c). For given ε, the security
condition is satisfied in the area enclosed by the contour D =
2ε. The contours for various values of ε ∈ [1.5×10−4, 3×10−3]
are shown. Other parameters: η = 0.5, ∆¯ = 0.2.
ulation attack is the most powerful attack against our
EAP, under the aforementioned assumptions. As dis-
cussed above, the emulation attack is certainly a power-
ful and general attack, which can break any EAP that
relies on classical read-out of optical or electronic PUKs.
By contrast, our EAP is robust against the emulation at-
tack, because the PUK is read-out by means of randomly
chosen non-orthogonal quantum states.
The security of the present protocol against other types
of attacks, in which the adversary has access to various
components of the verification set-up (e.g. to the laser
source, or the detection device) goes beyond the present
theoretical framework, and it is a subject of future the-
oretical and experimental work. Moreover, the perfor-
mance of the protocol when the verification set-up devi-
ates from the enrolment set-up (with respect to losses,
imperfections, etc), is an interesting question that de-
serves a thorough investigation (see appendix A). Such
deviations are expected to allow for new types of attacks,
including perhaps more sophisticated versions of the at-
tack considered in this work.
The emulation attack considered throughout this work
can be implemented with today’s technology, because it
only requires quantum measurements on coherent states
of light. An adversary, however, may also attack our
EAP using a quantum computer or a large-scale pho-
tonic simulator. Related security analysis for the EAP of
Ref. [9] suggests that such attacks require simultaneous
perfect control of a very large number of quantum states,
or optical elements, with negligible losses, which seems
to be a formidable challenge for current as well as for
future technology. Analogous arguments are expected to
be applicable to our scheme as well.
To summarize, quantum-optical EAPs is a very new
field of research, with only few relevant publications [9,
11]. There are many open questions about the power and
the limitations of such protocols, as well as about the
different kinds of attacks and their classification. The
present results provide a benchmark case and guide for
the planning of future experiments on the protocol of Ref.
[11].
Appendix A: Losses
The key component of our EAP is the interrogation
chamber, which is a standard wavefront-shaping set-up,
and is connected to the laser source and the HD set-up
via SMFs A and B, respectively [11]. In the diffusive
limit, the operation of the wavefront-shaping set-up can
be described in terms of a finite number of transverse spa-
tial modes, say N input and N output modes. Adopting
an input-output formalism, the mode of SMF A couples
to each one of the N input modes, whereas SMF B is
translated at the output plane and couples only to the
target mode [11]. The directional transfer of the scat-
tered photons to the target mode is never complete, and
part of the input light will be inevitably scattered to the
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other output modes. Hence, the amount of control the
wavefront shaping offers over the propagation of light is
quantified by the enhancement factor E , which in practise
it does not exceed the ideal value of piN/4. In addition,
to the imperfect concentration of scattered light at the
target mode, one expects losses which can be viewed as
coupling of the light to other modes, beyond the 2N in-
put/output modes of the wavefront shaping set-up, and
the two SMFs.
To account for losses in the interrogation chamber and
in the SMFs, we can introduce optical power transmis-
sions τIC , and τA(B), respectively. The mean number of
photons at the exit of SMF A is
µA = τAµP , (A1)
where µP is the mean number of photons in the probe
state at the entrance of SMF A. The mean number of
scattered photons at the entrance of SMF B in the case
of optimized SLM is given by [11]
µB = τICE
[
1
N
(
1− l
L
)]
µA. (A2)
In deriving this expression we have assumed slab geome-
try for the PUK, with thickness L, mean free path l, and
absorption length Labs, such that λ  l  L  Labs,
where λ is the wavelength of the probe. The transmis-
sion coefficient τIC . 1 accounts for losses in the inter-
rogation chamber, including absorption losses, imperfect
couplings etc. The mean number of photons that reach
the HD set-up is
µR = τBµB . (A3)
Combining Eqs. (A1) - (A3) we obtain
µR = E|F|2µP (A4)
where
|F|2 = τBτICτA
[
1
N
(
1− l
L
)]
. (A5)
We see therefore that |F|2, and thus µR, are indepen-
dent of k, and include all of the losses throughout the
propagation of the light in the set-up.
In the security analysis of the present work we as-
sume identical enrolment and verification set-ups. All of
the parameters of the set-ups (including losses, imperfec-
tions, enhancement, etc), are publicly available (see table
II). The mean number of photons that are expected to
reach the HD set-up of the verifier, i.e., µR, is also pub-
licly known. The security of the EAP relies solely on
keeping secret the random, independently chosen phases
of the probe states. Acceptance or rejection of the PUK
is decided upon the estimated average probability for an
outcome to fall in the bin, which is also publicly known.
If the adversary tries to reduce or increase the losses
in the set-up, relative to the publicly known values, the
verifier will inevitably receive responses that differ from
the expected ones both in amplitude (mean number of
photons), and in phase. The security analysis of Sec.
III can be adapted to this case as well, by taking into
account that 〈Qˆk˜(θ)〉 will differ from 〈Qˆk(θ)〉, both in
phase and in amplitude. In analogy to the discussion of
Sec. III, the adversary’s intervention will shift the photo-
count distributions the verifier samples from, relative to
the expected bins. It does not matter whether this shift
will be above or below 〈Qˆk(θ)〉, because the r.h.s. of Eq.
(14) is an even function of S.
In the envisioned implementation of our EAP, the
three major parts of the verification set-up i.e., the laser
source, the interrogation chamber and the detection set-
up (see Fig. 1), are located in the same or nearby
rooms. This means that their separation is tens of me-
ters, and thus the losses in the optical fibers that connect
them are negligible. Typically, for optical fibres at 1550
nm, the attenuation coefficient is ∼ 0.2dB/km, which
means almost perfect transmittance at these distances
(i.e., τA(B) & 0.99).
In closing this appendix it is worth pointing out that
effects of losses and imperfections may play some role
in the security of the protocol, if the verification set-up
deviates from the enrolment set-up. This scenario goes
beyond the present work, and deserves a careful security
analysis, because other types of attacks may be appli-
cable in this case. We strongly believe, however, that
for sufficiently small deviations, one can choose the bins’
width ∆ judiciously so that the protocol tolerates the
deviations.
Appendix B: Binning of normal distribution
Consider the normal distributionN (x¯, σ2), with prob-
ability density
P(x) = 1√
2piσ2
exp
(
− (x− x¯)
2
2σ2
)
(B1)
and a bin of size ∆ centred at x = b[
b− ∆
2
, b+
∆
2
]
.
The probability for a random sample from N (x¯, σ2), to
yield an outcome that falls in the bin is given by the
following integral
Pin =
∫ ∆
2
−∆2
dyP(y + b)
=
1
2
{
Erf
[
2(x¯− b) + ∆
2
√
2σ
]
− Erf
[
2(x¯− b)−∆
2
√
2σ
]}
=
1
2
{
Erf
[
2ξ¯ + ∆¯
2
√
2
]
− Erf
[
2ξ¯ − ∆¯
2
√
2
]}
, (B2)
where Erf(·) is the error function, ξ := x¯ − b, ξ¯ := ξ/σ
and ∆¯ := ∆/σ.
We see that Pin depends on the distance ξ between
the centres of the Gaussian and of the bin, as well as on
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the size of the bin ∆, relative to the standard deviation
σ. When the centers coincide i.e., for ξ = 0, the above
expression simplifies to Eq. (5).
Appendix C: Upper bound on probability for in-bin
event, in the presence of cheating
Consider a query (sample) with coherent probe state
|αk〉, which is fully characterized by the randomly chosen
integer k ∈ ZN . An adversary intercepts and measures
the unknown probe state, so that to learn k. Let k˜ denote
the adversary’s inference, and let βk˜ denote the coherent
state that is sent to the verifier’s HD set-up. The verifier
measures at random one of the two quadratures of the
electric field, by setting the phase of the LO θ, either to
0, or to pi/2.
The average probability for the verifier to obtain an
outcome in the expected bin is given by
Pin =
∑
k,k˜,θ
P (in, k, k˜, θ) =
∑
k,k˜,θ
P (in|k, k˜, θ)p(k, k˜)p(θ)
=
∑
k,θ
P (in|k, k˜ = k, θ)p(k, k˜ = k)p(θ)
+
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
∑
θ
P (in|k, k˜, θ)p(k, k˜)p(θ) (C1)
:= S1 + S2,
where we have used the fact that the angle θ is chosen
at random and independently of the choice of k, while
the adversary does not have access to the preparation
of the probe states, or to the HD set-up. Hence, the
inference of the right or wrong value of k by the adversary
is independent of the quadrature to be measured by the
verifier.
Let us consider first the summation S1. The condi-
tional probability P (in|k, k˜ = k, θ) is the probability for
an outcome to fall in the expected bin, given that the
verifier has prepared |αk〉, the cheater has inferred the
right value of k, and the verifier measures the θ quadra-
ture. Clearly, this probability is given by Eq. (5) (i.e.,
it is independent of k and θ), because the cheater’s in-
tervention has not changed anything relative to the ideal
scenario. The joint probability p(k, k˜ = k) is the proba-
bility for the verifier to send k, and the cheater to infer
the right value of k. Thus,∑
k
p(k, k˜ = k) = 1− perr, (C2)
where perr is the average probability for the adversary to
infer a wrong value for k. So, we have
S1 =
∑
k,θ
P (in|k, k˜ = k, θ)p(k, k˜ = k)p(θ)
= P
(0)
in
∑
k
p(k, k˜ = k) = (1− perr)P (0)in . (C3)
We focus now on the second term in Eq. (C1). The
joint probability p(k, k˜) is the probability for the verifier
to send k, and the cheater to infer a wrong value for
k, in the particular case k˜. Thus, if we sum over all
possible values of k and k˜ 6= k we will obtain the average
probability of error∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
p(k, k˜) = perr, (C4)
which also appears in Fano’s inequality (13). So, we have
S2 =
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
∑
θ
P (in|k, k˜, θ)p(k, k˜)p(θ) (C5)
=
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
p(k, k˜)
∑
θ=0,pi/2
P (in|k, k˜, θ)p(θ) (C6)
=
∑
k
∑
k˜ 6=k
p(k, k˜)P (in|k, k˜), (C7)
where P (in|k, k˜) is the conditional probability for an out-
come to fall in the expected bin, given that the verifier
has prepared |αk〉, the cheater has inferred k˜ 6= k, irre-
spective of the measured quadrature.
Hence, using Eq. (C4) we can bound S2 from above as
follows
S2 ≤ perr max
k,k˜
{P (in|k, k˜)}k˜ 6=k. (C8)
Using (C3) and (C8) in (C1) we have
Pin ≤ (1− perr)P (0)in + perr max
k,k˜
{P¯ (in|k, k˜)}k˜ 6=k.(C9)
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